Added
hnl prune: native files built for another operating system or CPU, in the packages HarnessLink installs, listed by package with sizes and removed on confirmation (--dry-run,--yes,--root <dir>to list another directory without touching it). Detection is structural — prebuildify/napi/native layouts, platform packages and npmos/cpu/libc, and Mach-O/ELF/PE headers — so a universal binary carrying this machine's slice, WebAssembly and shell shims named.exeare kept, and a package that ships no build for this machine is reported instead of emptied. Reinstalling a package restores its files.- The same pass runs automatically after every harness install and update, from the installers, and once ~90 s after the service starts (bounded, in the background):
cleanup.platformPrune, on by default,hnl prune offto stop it. On one Mac it reclaimed 265 MB across five packages. hnl doctorarea "Platform purity": foreign payloads, an installedhnlbuilt for another machine, and update leftovers beside it (hnl.old-<id>.exeparked by install.ps1, abandonedhnl.next) — removed byhnl doctor --fix, with thehnl.previousrollback copy always kept.- A release binary can no longer carry anything that confers server authority (ADR-99). Every compiled binary is scanned before it is hashed into the manifest, and the build fails on private key material,
.envcontent, Worker (cloud/) source, our D1/R2/Vectorize names or account ids, test code,.gitmetadata or a build-machine path — and on any bundle that so much as reads one of those files. Check any binary yourself:bun scripts/release-payload-scan.ts <file>.
Changed
docs/CLOUD_SETUP.mdnow says measurably what a release binary gives a reader. The client's JavaScript and every embedded prompt can be recovered from it, so what protects the product is the private repository, the proprietary licence, server-side enforcement, signed releases and modified-client flagging — not secrecy of the client.